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Abstract
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1 Introduction
The comparison of the expected revenues from private-value first-price and second-price
auctions (FPA and SPA henceforth) has been extensively analyzed, including the revenue
equivalence result by Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Myerson (1981). It also has been
shown that once some underlying assumptions are relaxed, not only the revenue equivalence
result does not necessarily hold, but the comparison results become ambiguous.1 In addition,
the analyses often have been limited to the two-player case, implying the lack of implications
for large auctions. Although our main results are not specific to large auctions, the explicit
analysis of large auctions is also important since (i) the understanding of large auctions has
been of theoretical interest (e.g., Wilson (1977)), and (ii) the emergence of online auctions,
for example, has made large auctions empirically more relevant.
In this paper, we revisit the revenue comparison of FPA and SPA. There are two depar-
tures from the literature. One is the use of the maximal elimination of weakly dominated
bids – all weakly dominated bids are eliminated – for both FPA and SPA.2 It has been typ-
ically the case that while SPA is analyzed by the maximal elimination of weakly dominated
bids, FPA is analyzed by Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It would be ideal to use the same so-
lution concept to assess the differences purely stemming from the comparison of two distinct
institutions.3 Another departure is that we follow a seminal work by Dekel and Wolinsky
(2003), which analyze FPA via rationalizability, and adopt discrete sets for both bids and
values.4 One advantage of the adoption of weak dominance and discrete setting is that we
require minimal assumptions. In particular, our analysis allows asymmetry and an arbitrary
number of players.
After providing technical details in Section 2, we compare the expected revenues of FPA
and SPA from the auctioneer’s point of view in Section 3. Our main result provides a
condition under which SPA generates a higher expected revenue compared to FPA. The key
is the comparison of the winning bids in FPA and SPA. The result on the winning bids in
1For example, Maskin and Riley (2000) and Kirkegaard (2012) analyzed the case of asymmetry. See
Maskin and Riley (2000), Kaplan and Zamir (2015a), Krishna (2010) and Milgrom (2004) for the overview
of related studies.
2We use interim weak dominance. That is, we apply weak dominance for the realization of each value.
We hence use “bids” instead of “strategies.” Note also that this does not imply an iterative procedure. We
use the iterative maximal elimination of weakly dominated bids later.
3While using Bayesian Nash equilibrium, it is sensible to look at the cases where players choose weakly
dominated bids. For example, with the assumption that players do not choose bids higher than their values
(implied by weak dominance), Maskin and Riley (2003) and Lebrun (2006) showed the uniqueness result
in FPA. Without this assumption, Kaplan and Zamir (2015b) provided an important insight by analyzing
asymmetric FPA to show the existence of multiple equilibria.
4Several other studies also analyze FPA via rationalizability, including Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003),
Cho (2005), and Robles and Shimoji (2012).
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FPA is due to Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) and Dekel and Wolinsky (2003) who provide
upper bounds for bids via weak dominance. The maximal elimination of weakly dominated
bids implies that the winning bids in SPA is higher than that of FPA. This leads to the
comparison of the highest bid in FPA and the second highest bid in SPA. Our condition (on
the auctioneer’s belief regarding players’ values) concerns the case where the highest and the
second highest bids are the same in SPA, in which case the price the winner pays in SPA is
higher than that of FPA.5 We also show that this result holds for large auctions. Under the
assumptions of (i) independently distributed values and (ii) the same highest value (whose
probability is bounded below by an arbitrary small number) for every player’s support, the
expected revenue from SPA is higher than that of FPA in large auctions.
In Section 4, we employ the iterative maximal elimination of weakly dominates bids
to further analyze players’ behavior. We provide a condition (on players’ beliefs regarding
opponets’ values) for the uniqueness result a` la Dekel and Wollinsky (2003) and Robles and
Shimoji (2012). Based on this result, with the additional assumption of (iii) players’ risk-
aversion, we show that as the number of players increases, the difference in the expected
revenues of FPA and SPA converges to the smallest monetary unit, which we denote d. This
implies the virtual revenue equivalence in large auctions for small d.
For asymmetric auctions, Kirkegaard (2012) identified sufficient conditions under which
FPA generates a higher expected revenue compared to SPA. Note that our result has a
different implication. Both the use of weak dominance for FPA and the discrete setting
lead to this difference. In Section 5, we use an example to demonstrate that the discretized
version of the condition in Kirkegaard (2012) and ours are not mutually exclusive.
2 Preliminaries
The set of players is N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2. We also deal with the auctioneer explicitly
in Section 3. We assume that possible values and bids for each player are (non-negative)
multiples of d > 0, an increment. Before the auction starts, each player i ∈ N observes her
value, vi ∈ Vi = {vi, vi + d, . . . , v¯i − d, v¯i} with vi ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N . Let v¯ = maxj∈N{v¯j}
and v = maxj∈N{vj}. Let v be a typical element of V = ×j∈NVj. We use the subscript “−i”
to represent player i’s opponents. Player i’s utility function is ui : R→ R which is assumed
to be strictly increasing.6 Player i’s utility is ui(vi− s) if she wins the object while it is ui(0)
5Since we do not address lower bounds of bids for FPA in Section 3, players may choose bids lower than
upper bounds in FPA. In this case, the gap between the expected revenues from SPA and FPA would be
even larger.
6We abuse the notation when we discuss weak dominance below to deal with players’ strategy profiles
explicitly. That is, given each auction rule, for each v ∈ V , the map from b(v) to Rn is implicitly embedded.
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otherwise.
We allow heterogeneous beliefs for players as well as the auctioneer. Let pvi be player
i’s belief regarding her opponents’ values when her value is vi ∈ Vi. Let P represent the
auctioneer’s belief over players’ values. We assume that each player i ∈ N with any vi ∈ Vi
assigns a strictly positive probability to every v−i ∈ V−i = ×j ̸=iVj and that the auctioneer
assigns a strictly positive probability to every v ∈ V .
Each player i chooses her bid bi ∈ Bi = {0, d, . . . , b¯i − d, b¯i} where v¯i ≤ b¯i for each i ∈ N
and hence Vi ⊆ Bi. A player wins only if her bid is the highest. If there are multiple players
who chose the highest bid, each one of them has an equal chance of winning. If player i ∈ N
is the winner, the price she pays, s, is such that s = bi for FPA and s = maxj ̸=i{bj} for SPA.
As stated in Introduction, we employ weak dominance as our solution concept. For each
player i ∈ N , let bi : Vi → Bi be player i’s pure-strategy, and Bi be the set of player i’s
strategies. A collection W includes a set Wi(vi) ⊆ Bi for each i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi. Given W ,
we say that b′i(vi) ∈ Wi(vi) weakly dominates bi(vi) ∈ Wi(vi) in W for player i with vi if
∑
v−i∈V−i
ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i(v−i))
η(b′
i
(vi),b−i(v−i))
pvi(v−i) ≥
∑
v−i∈V−i
ui(bi(vi),b−i(v−i))
η(bi(vi),b−i(v−i))
pvi(v−i)
for each b−i with the strict inequality for some b
′
−i where (i) b−i(v−i),b
′
−i(v−i) ∈ ×j ̸=iWj(vj)
for each v−i ∈ V−i and (ii) for each v ∈ V and (bi(vi),b−i(v−i)),
η(bi(vi),b−i(v−i)) =
{
1
η
}
if
{
bi(vi) ̸= b¯i
bi(vi) = b¯i and #{j ̸= i s.t. bj(vj) = b¯i} = η − 1
}
where b¯i = maxj ̸=i{bj(vj)}.7 Regarding η(bi(vi),b−i(v−i)), while the former includes the
cases where player i’s bid is either the unique highest or not the highest, the latter includes
the cases where player i is one of the players with the highest bid.8 Given W , we say that
bi(vi) is weakly dominated in W if there exists b
′
i(vi) which weakly dominates bi(vi) in W .
Since we apply weak dominance conditional on a player’s realized value, it is interim weak
dominance.
We now define the iterative maximal elimination of weakly dominated bids. For each
i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi, let W 0i (vi) = Bi and let W 0 be the corresponding collection. Given W t,
we define W t+1 recursively for each t = 0, 1, . . .:
W t+1i (vi) =
{
bi ∈ W ti (vi) | bi is not weakly dominated in W t
}
7For our analysis, it suffices to consider pure strategies only. See footnote 23.
8Remember that we do not assume ui(0) = 0.
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for each i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi. Note that the expression above says that any weakly dominated
bid is eliminated (i.e., “maximal elimination”). For each i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi, bi ∈ Bi survives
the iterative elimination of weakly dominated bids if bi ∈ W∞i (vi). In Section 3, we refer to
the case of t = 1 while it is t =∞ in Section 4.
3 Maximal Elimination of Weakly Dominated Bids
In this section, we solve both FPA and SPA via the maximal elimination of weakly dominated
bids.
3.1 Winning Bids in FPA and SPA
In SPA, for each i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi, bi = vi is the only bid surviving the maximal elimination
of weakly dominated bids (i.e., weakly dominant bid). Given v ∈ V , the winning bid in SPA
is hence maxj∈N{vj}.
For FPA, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003, p.41) and Dekel and Wolinsky (2003, Subsec-
tion 4.3) show that for each i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi, the highest bid which survives the maximal
elimination of weakly dominated bids is strictly lower than vi.
9
Lemma 1 (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) and Dekel and Wolinsky (2003)) For
each i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi, the highest bid which survives the maximal elimination of weakly
dominated bids in FPA is max{vi − d, 0}.
We then have the following result.
Corollary 1 Given v ∈ V , the highest possible winning bid in FPA is max{maxj∈N{vj −
d}, 0}.
Note that if v > 0, the expression is simply maxj∈N{vj − d}. Corollary 1 leads to the
following result.
Lemma 2 Given v ∈ V , the winning bid in SPA is weakly higher than the winning bid in
FPA. If maxj∈N{vj} > 0, the winning bid in SPA is strictly higher than the winning bid in
FPA.
If v > 0, the latter is indeed the case.
9Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) and Dekel and Wolinsky (2003) assume Vi = Vj for every i, j ∈ N (i.e.,
identical support) with v = 0 and the former uses the continuous bid and value spaces. Their insight remains
valid even with the heterogeneous supports. Although this result may be known, I could not trace a previous
study which explicitly states this.
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3.2 Revenue Comparison
Lemma 2 implies that if two highest values are the same and strictly higher than 0, the
revenue of SPA is strictly higher than that of FPA. The following result shows a condition
under which this possibility of “ties” outweighs other possibilities, leading to our main result.
Proposition 1 The expected revenue from SPA is strictly higher than that of FPA if
d
∑
v′∈{max{v,d},...,v¯}
P
(
∃i, j ∈ N such that vi = vj = v′
v′ ≥ vk ∀k ∈ N\{i, j}
)
>
∑
v′∈{max{v,2d},...,v¯}
∑
v′′∈{0,...,v′−2d}
[(v′ − d)− v′′]P
(
∃i, j ∈ N such that vi = v′
v′ − 2d ≥ vj = v′′ ≥ vk ∀k ∈ N\{i, j}
)
.
The expression on the left-hand side of the condition concerns the cases in which the
first and second highest values are equal, implying that the revenue from SPA is higher than
that of FPA. The expression on the right-hand side concerns the cases where the difference
between the first and second highest values are at least 2d, implying that the revenue from
FPA can be higher than that of SPA.10 The condition thus implies the former dominates
the latter, implying the result. In other words, if the chance that the highest and the second
highest values are the same is sufficiently high, the expected revenue from SPA is higher
than that of FPA.
Observation 1 Given that values are linear in d, the expressions on both sides are linear
in d, implying that d’s in both sides offset each other. In other words, while the number of
grids matters for the result, the size of d itself does not.
To visualize the implication of Proposition 1, Figure 1 plots the combination of two order
statistics, the highest and the second highest values, v′ and v′′ respectively.
A : v′ = v′′ corresponding to the left-hand side expression of Proposition 1. In this case,
(i) SPA leads to a higher revenue than FPA, and (ii) the difference in the revenues is
d.
B : v′ = v′′ + d which does not appear in the expression. In this case, FPA and SPA
generates the same revenue.
10Since we consider the best possible scenario for FPA, even if the condition in Proposition 1 does not
hold, this does not necessarily mean that FPA generates a higher expected return than SPA does.
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Figure 1: Visualization of Proposition 1
C : v′−v′′ ≥ 2d corresponding to the expression on the right-hand side. They are the cases
where (i) FPA generates a higher revenue than SPA and (ii) the difference of revenues
is at most (v′ − d)− v′′ ≥ d.
The expression in Proposition 1 says that if the realizations in A are likely, SPA generates a
higher expected revenue than FPA.
3.3 Large Auctions
We now provide a condition on the auctioneer’s belief under which Proposition 1 holds for
sufficiently large n.11 Given n, let
11For each n, we draw n players whose Vi’s are distributed according to some underlying distribution
which is reflected by qn below. We evaluate the ex ante (instead of interim) expected revenues from the two
auctions.
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• N¯ = {i ∈ N | v¯ ∈ Vi} and n¯ = |N¯ |,
• qn(n˜) be the probability that n¯ = n˜ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
• ρi(vi) be the probability that player i’s value is vi ∈ Vi.
We need the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 Players’ values are independently distributed.
Assumption 2 There exists ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that ρi(v¯) ≥ ρ for each i ∈ N¯ .
The expression on the left-hand side in Proposition 1 contains the probabilities that the
highest and second highest values are the same. The following result identifies a condition
under which the expression in Proposition 1 holds as n→∞.12
Proposition 2 Given Assumptions 1 and 2, if
lim
n→∞
{
n∑
n¯=2
qn(n¯)
[
1− n¯ρ(1− ρ)n¯−1 − (1− ρ)n¯]
}
= 1,
the condition in Proposition 1 holds for sufficiently large n.
The condition implies that as n becomes large, there are a sufficient number of players who
has v¯ in the support and the chance that there is at most one player whose value is v¯
diminishes. Note that if v¯i = v¯ for each i ∈ N , n¯ = n and hence qn(n) = 1.
Corollary 2 Given Assumptions 1 and 2, if v¯i = v¯ for each i ∈ N , Proposition 1 holds for
sufficiently large n.
As an example, consider the case of Vi = {0, . . . , v¯} for each i ∈ N and each player’s
value is independently and uniformly distributed. Let |V | = m+ 1 (i.e., v¯ = md) and hence
the probability attached to each value is 1
m+1
. The expression in Proposition 1 becomes
d
m+1∑
i=2
(
n
2
)(
1
m+ 1
)2(
i
m+ 1
)n−2
>
m+1∑
i=3
i−2∑
j=1
[(i− 1)− j]d
(
n
1
)(
1
m+ 1
)(
n− 1
1
)(
1
m+ 1
)(
j
m+ 1
)n−2
12The proof in Yu (1999, Proposition 13) for the symmetric case carries the same observation; i.e., the
probability that the first and second highest values coincide converges to one as n→∞.
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which can be simplified as:
m+1∑
i=2
in−2 − 2
m+1∑
i=3
i−2∑
j=1
(i− j − 1)jn−2 > 0. (1)
For large m, it is sufficient for the number of players, n, to be approximately 88.2% of m to
maintain (1).
4 Iterative Maximal Elimination of Weakly Dominated
Bids
The result for FPA is not as sharp as that of SPA. This is because we have focused on (one
round of) the maximal elimination of weakly dominated bids and strictly increasing utility
functions. If we use the iterative maximal elimination of weakly dominated bids and weakly
concave (still strictly increasing) utility functions, we obtain a condition under which the
uniqueness result (i.e., for each i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi, only one bid survives iterative weak
dominance) is achieved for FPA. This is a variant of the results from Dekel and Wolinsky
(2003) and Robles and Shimoji (2012) which use rationalizability.13 This result leads to the
virtual revenue equivalence.
4.1 Uniqueness in FPA
In this subsection, we show a condition under which each player i ∈ N with vi ∈ Vi has a
unique bid surviving the iterative maximal elimination of weakly dominated bids. Let
• player i′ ∈ N be such that v¯i′ = v¯ and vˆ = maxj ̸=i′{v¯j} (i.e., the second highest upper
bound).
We need the following assumption:
Assumption 3 For each i ∈ N , ui is weakly concave.
13Since their results use rationalizability, they immediately apply to weak dominance. One condition
in Dekel and Wolinsky (2003) implies that n is higher than the number of available bids and Robles and
Shimoji (2012) assumes n ≥ 3. To identify the upper bounds of bids, Robles and Shimoji (2012), using
rationalizability, concerns all surviving bid profiles of the opponents. Their result compares two adjoining
values and requires that the probability that opponents’ values are at the higher value is higher so that a
lower bid has a lower chance of winning. In the current paper where we consider weak dominance, we only
focus on the bid profiles of the opponents with which a lower bid wins since that a higher bid does not win
implies that a lower bid does not win. We are also explicit about the value of the player in consideration.
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Figure 2: Uniqueness in FPA
We then have the following result:
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 3 holds. For each α ∈ {2, . . . , min{v¯−d,vˆ}
d
}, suppose that
the following expression holds for each i ∈ N with vi ≥ (α + 1)d:
n−1∑
k=0
pvi (|# of j’s such that vj ≥ αd| = k)
1
k + 1
≤ vi − αd
vi − (α− 1)d.
Then,
• if v¯− vˆ ≤ d, the only bid which survives iterative weak dominance is bi = max{vi−d, 0}
for each i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi, and
• if v¯ − vˆ ≥ 2d, the only bid which survives iterative weak dominance is
1. bi = max{vi − d, 0} for each i with vi ≤ vˆ + d and
2. bi′ = vˆ for player i
′ with vi′ ≥ vˆ + 2d.
Note that the right-hand side expression in the condition is at least 1
2
. The result is visualized
in Figure 2.
We already know that for vi ∈ {0, d}, bi = 0 is the unique weakly dominant bid. With
the assumption that ui is weakly concave, we can also show that for any vi ≥ 2d, bi = 0 is
eliminated. Consider vi ≥ 3d and compare bi = d and bi = 2d:
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1. bi = 2d may win even if bi = d does not win (but not vice versa). In particular, if the
opponents’ highest bid is 2d, the expected utility from bi = 2d is strictly positive while
it is zero for bi = d.
2. If bi = d wins, the opponents’ highest bid is either d or 0. This is the only case where
the expected utility from bi = 2d may be lower than that of bi = d. In this particular
scenario, given the argument above,
• bj = d for every j ∈ N with vj ≥ 2d, and
• bj = 0 (only surviving bid) for every j ∈ N with vj ≤ d.
The corresponding utility is ui(vi − d). The left-hand side expression in the condition
corresponds to the probability that bi = d wins. Note that bi = 2d wins in this case
and the corresponding utility is ui(vi − 2d).
The condition in Proposition 3 rather states that the expected return from bi = 2d is higher
than that of bi = d if the opponents’ highest bid is either d or 0. This condition is sufficient as
long as ui is weakly concave (Jensen’s inequality). The same argument is applied repeatedly
to obtain the result.
We would like to emphasize two points. First, note that the condition in Proposition
3 is easier to be satisfied if, for player i ∈ N with vi ≥ (α + 1)d, it is more likely that
a large number of the opponents have values weakly higher than αd. This can be seen
in the example in the next subsection. Second, given that we allow heterogeneous beliefs,
there are two reasons that neither of the conditions in Propositions 1 and 3 implies the
other.14 One reason is that while the condition in Proposition 1 concerns the auctioneer’s
belief regarding players’ values, the condition in Proposition 3 is related to players’ beliefs
regarding opponents’ values. The other reason is a difference in their focuses. The condition
in Proposition 1 looks at two order statistics, the highest and the second highest values. It
thus has no implication about other lower values. The condition in Proposition 3, instead,
concerns how many opponents have values above the threshold. It therefore does not say
anything about how many of them have the highest and the second-highest values.
4.2 Example – Condition of Proposition 3 and Upper Bounds in
FPA
In this subsection, we provide a simple example for two reasons. First, the example demon-
strates how the iterative elimination procedure works. This is, in particular, in relation
14The same argument applies to the comparison of Propositions 2 and 4.
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to the condition in Proposition 3. Second, Lemma 1 identifies an upper bound of bid for
each value in FPA. This becomes tight once we use the iterative maximal elimination of
weakly dominated bids under the condition in Proposition 3. The example shows that if the
condition in Proposition 3 does not hold, however, the application of the iterative maximal
elimination of weakly dominated bids may lead to lower upper bounds in FPA.15
Consider two-player independent private-value FPA with d = 1. The set of values for
player i = 1, 2 is Vi = {0, 1, 2, 3} and let Bi = Vi. The chance of each vi is ρ(0) = α, ρ(1) = β,
ρ(2) = γ, and ρ(3) = 1− α− β − γ where for each vi ∈ Vi, ρ(vi) ∈ (0, 1).
First Step. Lemma 1 says that for each i ∈ {1, 2} and vi ∈ Vi, any bi > max{vi − d, 0} is
weakly dominated. In addition, assuming that ui is weakly concave for each i ∈ N , bi = 0 is
also weakly dominated for each i ∈ {1, 2} and vi ∈ {2, 3} at the first step: For vi ∈ {2, 3},
the expected utility from bi = 0 is either (i)
1
2
(ui(vi)+ ui(0)) if bj = 0 or (ii) ui(0) otherwise.
The expected utility from bi = 1 is (i) ui(vi − 1) if bj = 0, (ii) 12(ui(vi − 1) + ui(0)) if bj = 1
or (iii) ui(0) otherwise. Since
ui(vi − 1) ≥ ui(vi2 ) ≥ 12 [ui(vi) + ui(0)]
for each vi ∈ {2, 3} where the second inequality comes from Jensen’s inequality, bi = 1
weakly dominates bi = 0 for each i ∈ {1, 2} and vi ∈ {2, 3}. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, we have (i)
{0} for vi ∈ {0, 1}, (ii) {1} for vi = 2, and (iii) {1, 2} for vi = 3 as remaining bids.
Second Step. Our focus is on vi = 3. The expected utility from bi = 1 is
(α + β)ui(2) + γ
[
1
2
(ui(2) + ui(0))
]
+(1− α− β − γ)
[{
1
2
(ui(2) + ui(0))
ui(0)
}
if bj(3) =
{
1
2
}]
(2)
while the expected utility from bi = 2 is
(α + β + γ)ui(1) + (1− α− β − γ)
[{
ui(1)
1
2
(ui(1) + ui(0))
}
if bj(3) =
{
1
2
}]
. (3)
Then,
(2)− (3)
15This observation is due to Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) which use rationalizability and the continuous
bid and value spaces.
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= (α + β)(ui(2)− ui(1)) + γ
{
1
2
(ui(2) + ui(0))− ui(1)
}
(1− α− β − γ)
[{
1
2
(ui(2) + ui(0))− ui(1)
ui(0)− 12(ui(1) + ui(0))
}
if bj(3) =
{
1
2
}]
.
Note (i) the first term is strictly positive, and (ii) the second term and the first expression
of the third term (bj(3) = 1) are weakly positive since ui is weakly concave, and (iii) the
second expression of the third term (bj(3) = 2) is strictly negative. First, if α+ β is close to
zero (i.e., the condition in Proposition 3 holds), bi = 2 weakly dominates bi = 1 for vi = 3,
consistent with Proposition 3. Second, if α+ β is close to one instead (i.e., the condition in
Proposition 3 does not hold), bi = 1 strictly dominates bi = 2 for vi = 3. In other words,
upper bounds of bids may be even lower than what Lemma 1 suggests.
4.3 Large Auctions
Consider again the case of large auctions with independent distributions from the previous
section. Remember the definition of vˆ in the previous subsection: the second highest upper
bound. Given n, let
• Nˆi = {j ∈ N\{i} | vˆ ∈ Vj} for each i ∈ N and nˆi = |Nˆi|,
• rvi,n(n˜) be the probability from the view point of player i with vi ∈ Vi that nˆi = n˜ ∈
{1, . . . , n− 1}, and
• τi(vi ≥ v˜) be the probability that player i’s value vi ∈ Vi is weakly higher than v˜.
Instead of Assumption 2, we require the following:
Assumption 4 There exists τ ∈ (0, 1) such that τi(vi ≥ vˆ) ≥ τ for each i ∈ Nˆ .
We then have the following result.
Proposition 4 Given Assumptions 1, 3 and 4, if
lim
n→∞
{
n−1∑
nˆi=1
rvi,n(nˆi)
1− (1− τ)nˆi
nˆiτ
}
≤ 1
2
,
for each i ∈ N with vi ≥ 3d, the result of Proposition 3 holds for sufficiently large n.
For example, the condition holds if rvi,n(nˆ) is lower for smaller nˆ’s. Again, if v¯i = v¯ for each
i ∈ N (i.e., rvi,n(n− 1) = 1), the result immediately holds.
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Corollary 3 Given Assumptions 1, 3 and 4, if v¯i = v¯ for each i ∈ N , Proposition 3 holds
for sufficiently large n.
As an example, consider again the case where Vi = {0, . . . ,md} for each i ∈ N and the
values are independently and uniformly distributed. Given α ∈ {2, . . . ,m−1}, the left-hand
side expression in Proposition 3 becomes
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)(
m+ 1− α
m+ 1
)k (
α
m+ 1
)(n−1)−k (
1
k + 1
)
=
m+ 1
(m+ 1− α)n
[
1−
(
α
m+ 1
)n]
.
Remember that the right-hand side expression in Proposition 3 is at least 1
2
. Thus, for any
α ∈ {2, . . . ,m− 1}, n ≥ m+ 1 suffices.
Given Corollaries 2 and 3 above, we have the following result.16
Proposition 5 Given Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, if v¯i = v¯ for each i ∈ N , the difference
of the expected revenues from FPA and SPA via iterative weak dominance converges to d as
n→∞.
This can be seen as the virtual revenue equivalence result for small d in large auctions.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss (i) the order dependence of weak dominance, and (ii) the compar-
ison of our result to Kirkegaard (2012).
5.1 Order Dependence
The emphasis on “maximal” elimination is due to the possibility of the order dependence
of weak dominance.17 That is, different orders of elimination could lead to different pre-
dictions. As an example, consider the two-player SPA where the supports of their values,
Vi = {vi, . . . , v¯i} for each i ∈ {1, 2}, is such that v¯2 < v1. First, eliminate all bids except
b1 = v1 for player 1 with v1 ∈ V1 at the first step. Then, for player 2, eliminate every b2 ≥ v1
at the second step. No further elimination occurs. In this case, the second highest bid can
16Proposition 4 itself does not state that the expected revenue from FPA converges to v¯ − d. In addition,
since v¯i = v¯ for each i ∈ N , Assumptions 2 and 4 essentially have the same implication.
17See for example Marx and Swinkels (1997).
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be higher or lower than v2, and the price the winner (player 1) pays cannot be uniquely
identified for any v2 ∈ V2. Note that this applies not only to our result, but also to previous
studies which use weak dominance for SPA.
Despite this observation, to support our use of maximal elimination, we point out that
Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler (2008) provide an epistemic foundation for the
iterative maximal elimination of weakly dominated strategies.18
5.2 On Kirkegaard (2012)
Kirkegaard (2012) identifies two conditions under which FPA leads to a higher expected rev-
enue than SPA. There are several reasons why our result is different from that of Kirkegaard
(2012). One reason is that values and bids are discrete in our setting while they are continu-
ous in Kirkegaard (2012) – a tie is not possible in Kirkegaard (2012). Another reason is that
while our focus is on weak dominance, Kirkegaard (2012) uses Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for
FPA. We now demonstrate that even if (a discretized version of) a condition in Kirkegaard
(2012) is satisfied in our discrete setting, it is possible that our condition still hold.19
Kirkegaard (2012) considers the case of (i) two players and (ii) the bid and value spaces
are continuous. Take V ′i as a closed interval for i ∈ {1, 2}, i.e,. V ′i = [vi, v¯i]. Kirkegaard
(2012) assumes that the supports for values are such that 0 ≤ v2 ≤ v1 and v¯2 < v¯1 (player 1
is strong and player 2 is weak). Let Fi(v) be the pdf for player i’s value. Kirkegaard (2012)
assumes
f1(v)
F1(v)
≥ f2(v)
F2(v)
and
f1(v)
1− F1(v) ≤
f2(v)
1− F2(v) for any v ∈ V
′
1 ∩ V ′2 . (4)
That is, F1 dominates F2 in terms of not only the reverse hazard rate but also the hazard
rate. Given v2, let r(v2) = F
−1
1 (F2(v2)) (or F1(r(v2)) = F2(v2)). The sufficient condition in
18Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) proposed the following solution concept with the presence of payoff uncer-
tainty; the elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by iterative elimination of strictly dominated
strategies. Bo¨rgers (1994) and Brandenburger (1990) also gave the characterizations. With the maximal
elimination of weakly dominated strategies at the first round, this solution concept (with the previous results
from Dekel and Wollinsky (2003) and Robles and Shimoji (2012) on strict dominance) will have the same im-
plications as ours in the current paper. Another similar solution concept is the level-k model which Crawford
and Iriberri (2007) applied to auctions. The implication of level-k in the current context crucially depends on
the assumption of L0 and the distribution of values. In addition, while we use weak dominance, the level-k
model seeks best-responses to a given belief depending on a player’s level of strategic sophistication. The
importance of distinguishing weak dominance and best response is discussed in, for example, Costa-Gomes
and Shimoji (2015).
19Kirkegaard (2012) has two sufficient conditions. We only focus on one of them.
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Kirkegaard (2012, Expression (9)) is
f2(v2) ≥ f1(v1) for all v2 ∈ V ′2 and v1 ∈ [v2, r(v2)]. (5)
Note that in the discrete setting, there does not exist the corresponding r(v2) for each v2 ∈ V2
generically. Thus, we instead require (5) to hold for every v1 ∈ {v2, . . . , v¯1}. We also look at
the discretized version of (4).
We now turn to an example in the discrete setting. Consider the following example:
V1 = {v2, v2 + d, . . . , v¯2︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ
, v¯2 + d} and
V2 = {v2, v2 + d, . . . , v¯2︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ
}
where (i) v2 > 0 and (ii) κ is a positive integer. Note that v¯1 = v¯2 + d and hence V2 ⊂ V1.
The players’ values are independently distributed. Let
• ρ1(v1) = ε for each v1 ∈ V1\{v2} and ρ2(v2) = ε for each v ∈ V2\{v2}, and
• ρ1(v2) = 1− (κ+ 1)ε and ρ2(v2) = 1− κε.
We also assume that ε is sufficiently small.
The first inequality in (4) holds with the equality for v2 and with the strict inequality
for every v ∈ V2\{v2}. The second inequality in (4) holds with strict inequality for every
v ∈ V2. The inequality in (5) holds with the strict inequality for v2 and with the equality
for every v1 ∈ V1\{v2} and v2 ∈ V2\{v2}. Consider the expression in Proposition 1. For
sufficiently small ε, the sum of probabilities on the left-hand side is close to one, implying
that the inequality is satisfied.20
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A Proof of Proposition 1
The highest possible revenue in FPA is max{maxi∈N{vi− d}, 0}. The revenue in SPA is the
second highest value. Note that if there are multiple highest values which are strictly higher
than 0, the revenue from SPA is strictly higher than that of FPA.
Let v′ be the highest value and v′′ be the second highest value. The expected revenue
from SPA (left-hand side) is strictly higher than that of FPA (right-hand side) if
∑
v′∈{max{v,d},...,v¯}
∑
v′′∈{0,...,v′}
v′′P
(
∃i, j ∈ N such that
v′ = vi ≥ v′′ = vj ≥ vk ∀k ∈ N\{i, j}
)
>
∑
v′∈{max{v,d},...,v¯}
(v′ − d)P
(
∃i ∈ N such that
vi = v
′ ≥ vj ∀j ∈ N\{i}
)
⇔
∑
v′∈{max{v,d},...,v¯}
v′P
(
∃i, j ∈ N such that vi = vj = v′
v′ ≥ vk ∀k ∈ N\{i, j}
)
+
∑
v′∈{max{v,d},...,v¯}
(v′ − d)P
(
∃i, j ∈ N such that vi = v′
vj = v
′ − d ≥ vk ∀k ∈ N\{i, j}
)
+
∑
v′∈{max{v,2d},...,v¯}
∑
v′′∈{0,...,v′−2d}
v′′P
(
∃i, j ∈ N such that vi = v′
v′ − 2d ≥ vj = v′′ ≥ vk ∀k ∈ N\{i, j}
)
>
∑
v′∈{max{v,d},...,v¯}
(v′ − d)P
(
∃i, j ∈ N such that vi = vj = v′
v′ ≥ vk ∀k ∈ N\{i, j}
)
+
∑
v′∈{max{v,d},...,v¯}
(v′ − d)P
(
∃i, j ∈ N such that vi = v′
vj = v
′ − d ≥ vk ∀k ∈ N\{i, j}
)
+
∑
v′∈{max{v,2d},...,v¯}
(v′ − d)
∑
v′′∈{0,...,v′−2d}
P
(
∃i, j ∈ N such that vi = v′
v′ − 2d ≥ vj = v′′ ≥ vk ∀k ∈ N\{i, j}
)
⇔ d
∑
v′∈{max{v,d},...,v¯}
P
(
∃i, j ∈ N such that vi = vj = v′
v′ ≥ vk ∀k ∈ N\{i, j}
)
>
∑
v′∈{max{v,2d},...,v¯}
∑
v′′∈{0,...,v′−2d}
[(v′ − d)− v′′]P
(
∃i, j ∈ N such that vi = v′
v′ − 2d ≥ vj = v′′ ≥ vk ∀k ∈ N\{i, j}
)
.
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B Proof for Proposition 2
Given n and n¯ where 2 ≤ n¯ ≤ n, take the probability that the second highest value is v¯:
n¯∑
η=2

∑
i1∈N¯
∑
i2>i1
· · ·
∑
iη>iη−1
ρi1(v¯)ρi2(v¯) · · · ρiη(v¯)
∏
k ̸=i1,...,iη
(1− ρk(v¯))

 (6)
where {i1, . . . , iη} ⊆ N¯ . The lower bound of the expression above is
n¯∑
η=2
(
n¯
η
)
ρη(1− ρ)n¯−η
=
n¯∑
η=0
(
n¯
η
)
ρη(1− ρ)n¯−η − n¯ρ(1− ρ)n¯−1 − (1− ρ)n¯
= 1− n¯ρ(1− ρ)n¯−1 − (1− ρ)n¯.
Note that the last two expression converge to zero as n¯→∞ (Corollary 2).
The lower bound for the left-hand expression in Proposition 1 (without d) is hence
n∑
n¯=2
qn(n¯)
[
1− n¯ρ(1− ρ)n¯−1 − (1− ρ)n¯] .
Hence, if
lim
n→∞
{
n∑
n¯=2
qn(n¯)
[
1− n¯ρ(1− ρ)n¯−1 − (1− ρ)n¯]
}
= 1,
the expression on the left-hand side of Proposition 1 converges to d while the one on the
right-hand side converges to zero.
C Revenue Comparison: Uniform Example
Consider again (1):
m+1∑
i=2
in−2 − 2
m+1∑
i=3
i−2∑
j=1
(i− j − 1)jn−2 > 0,
20
or
2n−2 +
m+1∑
i=3
[
in−2 − 2
i−2∑
j=1
(i− j − 1)jn−2
]
> 0.
We compare the terms in the parentheses for each i ∈ {3, . . . ,m+ 1}.
Let
A(i, n) = in−2 − 2
i−2∑
j=1
(i− j − 1)jn−2
= in−2 − 2
i−2∑
j=1
jn−2 − 2
i−2∑
j=1
((i− 1)− j − 1)jn−2
= in−2 − 2
i−2∑
j=1
jn−2 − 2
i−3∑
j=1
((i− 1)− j − 1)jn−2
= in−2 − 2
i−2∑
j=1
jn−2 − (i− 1)n−2 +
[
(i− 1)n−2 − 2
i−3∑
j=1
((i− 1)− j − 1)jn−2
]
= in−2 − 2
i−2∑
j=1
jn−2 − (i− 1)n−2 + A(i− 1, n), (7)
and
D(i, n) = A(i, n)− A(i− 1, n)
= in−2 − 2
i−2∑
j=1
jn−2 − (i− 1)n−2
= in−2 − 2
i−2∑
j=1
jn−2 − (i− 1)n−2 −
[
(i− 1)n−2 − 2
i−3∑
j=1
jn−2 − (i− 2)n−2
]
+
[
(i− 1)n−2 − 2
i−3∑
j=1
jn−2 − (i− 2)n−2
]
= in−2 − (i− 2)n−2 − 2(i− 1)n−2 +D(i− 1, n). (8)
For every i ≥ 3, (i) A(i, n) is strictly increasing in n if A(i, n) ≥ 0 and (ii) D(i, n) is
strictly increasing in n if D(i, n) ≥ 0:
∂A(i, n)
∂n
= in−2 ln(i)− 2
i−2∑
j=1
(i− j − 1)jn−2 ln(j) > ln(i)A(i, n)
21
∂D(i, n)
∂n
= in−2 ln(i)− 2
i−2∑
j=1
jn−2 ln(j)− (i− 1)n−2 ln(i− 1) > ln(i)D(i, n).
Hence, for every i ≥ 3, if A(i, n′) ≥ 0 for some n′, A(i, n) > 0 for any n > n′. Likewise, if
D(i, n′′) ≥ 0 for some n′′, D(i, n) > 0 for any n > n′′.
We use induction to show that our claim holds. For the initial step, note that
A(3, n) = 3n−2 − (2× 1n−2) > 0
D(3, n) = 3n−2 − (2× 1n−2)− 2n−2 > 0
for any n ≥ 4.
Suppose now that there exist i˜ ≥ 3 and n˜ ≥ 4 such that for each i ∈ {3, . . . , i˜}, A(i, n˜) > 0
and D(i, n˜) > 0 (this is the case for i˜ = 3 and n˜ = 4). If A(˜i + 1, n˜) > 0, choosing n = n˜
suffices. Suppose instead A(˜i+ 1, n˜) ≤ 0. Given that A(˜i, n˜) > 0 and D(˜i, n˜) > 0, it suffices
to find n∗ > n˜ such that,
(˜i+ 1)n
∗−2 − (˜i− 1)n∗−2 − 2˜in∗−2 ≥ 0.
This is because A(˜i, n∗) > 0 and D(˜i, n∗) > 0. The inequality above implies D(˜i+1, n∗) > 0
and hence A(˜i+ 1.n∗) > 0.
Note that
in−2 − (i− 2)n−2 − 2(i− 1)n−2
= (i− 1)n−2
{(
i
i− 1
)n−2
−
(
i− 2
i− 1
)n−2
− 2
}
= (i− 1)n−2


[(
1 +
1
i− 1
)i−1]n−2i−1
−
[(
1− 1
i− 1
)i−1]n−2i−1
− 2


where (i) the expression in the parentheses is strictly increasing with respect to the power
(i.e., n−2
i−1
) and (ii) we have limi→∞(1 +
1
i−1
)i−1 = e and limi→∞(1 − 1i−1)i−1 = e−1. Let
ln(y) = n−2
i−1
and we have
eln(y) − 1
eln(y)
≥ 2 ⇔ y2 − 2y − 1 ≥ 0
where (i) y = 1 +
√
2 if the expression is zero and (ii) the expression is strictly increasing if
22
y > 1. Note that ln (1 +
√
2) ≈ 0.8813.21
D Proof for Proposition 3
First Step:
• For each i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi\{0}, every bi ≥ vi is weakly dominated. None of them
leads to a utility strictly higher than ui(0) while bi < vi secures ui(0) or higher (e.g.,
the opponents’ highest bid is equal to bi).
• For each i ∈ N with vi = 0, every bi ≥ d is weakly dominated. Every bi ≥ d leads to a
utility of ui(0) or less (e.g., every opponent bids zero) and bi = 0 guarantees ui(0).
• For each i ∈ N with vi ≥ 2d, bi = d weakly dominates bi = 0. The only way bi = 0
wins is that every opponent bids zero as well. In this case, the expected utility with
bi = 0 is
1
n
ui(vi) +
n−1
n
ui(0) while it is ui(vi − d) with bi = d. Since n ≥ 2, we have
ui(vi − d) = ui
(
vi−d
vi
vi
)
≥
(
vi−d
vi
)
ui(vi) +
(
d
vi
)
ui(0) ≥
(
1
n
)
ui(vi) +
(
n−1
n
)
ui(0)
for any weakly concave ui.
22 For the other possibilities, bi = d leads to a utility weakly
higher than that of bi = 0 (i.e., ui(0)). In particular, if the opponents’ highest bid is
d, the inequality is strict.
The sets of bids surviving the maximal elimination of weakly dominated bids are (i) {max{vi−
d, 0}} for vi ∈ {0, d, 2d} – note that they are unique – and (ii) {d, . . . , vi − d} for vi > 2d.
We need to check that for every vi > 2d, no other bid is eliminated. For each vi > 2d, take
any bi, bˇi ∈ {d, . . . , vi − d} where bˇi < bi.
1. bˇi does not weakly dominate bi; if the opponents’ highest bid is bi, the expected utility
from bi is strictly higher than ui(0) while bˇi only leads to ui(0).
2. bi does not weakly dominate bˇi; if the opponents bid zero, the utility from bˇi is strictly
higher than that of bi.
This completes the first step.23
21Remember that our result ignores the term 2n−2 in the first expression. The actual ratio hence can be
lower.
22Note that this does not necessarily hold without the concavity of ui. The first inequality uses Jensen’s
inequality. The second inequality holds since vi−d
vi
≥ 1
2
≥ 1
n
.
23Note that there are at most two best-responses to any bid profile of the opponents in FPA; either (i)
tying the highest bid from the opponents or (ii) bidding the highest bid from the opponents plus d. This
immediately implies that the use of mixed strategies for weak dominance does not alter our argument. The
same argument applies to higher steps we discuss below.
23
As in the main text, let i′ ∈ N be such that v¯i′ = v¯ and vˆ = maxj ̸=i′{v¯j}. The next part is
included if v¯ − vˆ ≥ 2d.
Second Step: For player i′ ∈ N with vi′ ≥ vˆ + 2d, every bi′ ≥ vˆ + d is weakly dominated
since the highest possible bid of the opponents is vˆ − d.
In effect, we treat player i′ with vi′ ≥ vˆ + 2d as vˆ + d from the third step. The repetition of
the next step leads to the result.
α-th Step (α ≥ 2): Suppose that there exists α ≥ 2 such that for each i ∈ N , the set of
remaining bids are
• {max{vi − d, 0}} for vi ≤ αd, and
• {(α− 1)d, . . . , vi − d} for vi ≥ (α + 1)d.24
Take player i ∈ N with vi ≥ (α+1)d. We compare bi = (α− 1)d and bi = αd. Note that
bi = (α − 1)d wins only if bj ≤ (α − 1)d for each j ∈ N\{i}. In this scenario, the expected
utility from bi = (α− 1)d is
n−1∑
k=0
pvi(|# of j’s such that vj ≥ αd| = k)
[(
1
k + 1
)
ui(vi − (α− 1)d) +
(
k
k + 1
)
ui(0)
]
(9)
while the utility from bi = αd is ui(vi − αd).25 Jensen’s inequality implies
(9)
≤
n−1∑
k=0
pvi(|# of j’s such that vj ≥ αd| = k)ui
(
vi − (α− 1)d
k + 1
)
≤ ui
(
n−1∑
k=0
pvi(|# of j’s such that vj ≥ αd| = k)
vi − (α− 1)d
k + 1
)
.
Since ui is strictly increasing, the inequality below is equivalent to ui(vi − αd) ≥ (9):
vi − αd ≥
n−1∑
k=0
pvi(|# of j’s such that vj ≥ αd| = k)
vi − (α− 1)d
k + 1
24Note that the statement holds for α = 2. In addition, note that the latter becomes {(α−1)d, . . . ,min{vi−
d, vˆ}} from the third step.
25Note that any player j ∈ N\{i} with vj ≤ (α− 1)d never wins in this scenario.
24
or
vi − αd
vi − (α− 1)d ≥
n−1∑
k=0
pvi(|# of j’s such that vj ≥ αd| = k)
1
k + 1
.
For the other profiles of the opponents’ bids, bi = αd leads to a utility weakly higher
than that of bi = (α− 1)d. In particular, if the opponents’ highest bid is αd, the inequality
is strict. Hence, under the condition above, bi = αd weakly dominates bi = (α− 1)d for each
i ∈ N with vi ≥ (α + 1)d.
Then, the remanning bids are
• {max{vi − d, 0}} for vi ≤ (α + 1)d, and
• {αd, . . . ,min{vi − d, vˆ}} for vi ≥ (α + 2)d.
We need to check that for each i ∈ N with vi ≥ (α + 2)d, no other bid is eliminated. For
each vi ≥ (α + 2)d, take any bi, bˇi ∈ {αd, . . . ,min{vi − d, vˆ}} where bˇi < bi.
1. bˇi does not weakly dominate bi; if the opponents’ highest bid is bi, the expected utility
from bi is strictly higher than ui(0) while bˇi only leads to ui(0).
2. bi does not weakly dominate bˇi; if the opponent’s highest bid is (α − 1)d or less, the
utility from bˇi is strictly higher than that of bi.
This completes the α-th step. The repetition of the same argument leads to our claim.
E Proof of Proposition 4
Given Nˆ , when players’ values are independently distributed, the upper bound for the left-
hand side of the condition in Proposition 3 (i.e., the chance that bi = (α− 1)d wins) is
nˆ−1∑
k=0
(
nˆ− 1
k
)
τ k(1− τ)(nˆ−1)−k
(
1
k + 1
)
=
nˆ−1∑
k=0
(nˆ− 1)!
(k + 1)!((nˆ− 1)− k)!τ
k(1− τ)(nˆ−1)−k
=
1
nˆτ
nˆ−1∑
k=0
nˆ!
(k + 1)!(nˆ− (k + 1))!τ
k+1(1− τ)nˆ−(k+1)
=
1
nˆτ
nˆ∑
l=1
nˆ!
l!(nˆ− l)!τ
l(1− τ)nˆ−l
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=
1− (1− τ)nˆ
nˆτ
.
Note that there are at least two players who can have the values weakly higher than vˆ.
Hence, given the definition of vˆ, nˆi ≥ 1 for each i ∈ N .26 Therefore, if
lim
n→∞
{
n−1∑
nˆi=1
rvi,n(nˆi)
1− (1− τ)nˆi
nˆiτ
}
≤ 1
2
for each i ∈ N with vi ≥ 3d, the condition in Proposition 3 holds. Remember that the
expression on the right-hand expression in the condition of Proposition 3 is weakly higher
than 1
2
.
F Virtual Revenue Equivalence: Uniform Example
Given α, we have
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)(
m+ 1− α
m+ 1
)k (
α
m+ 1
)(n−1)−k (
1
k + 1
)
=
(
1
m+ 1
)n−1 n−1∑
k=0
(n− 1)!
k![(n− 1)− k]! (m+ 1− α)
kα(n−1)−k
(
1
k + 1
)
=
(
1
m+ 1
)n−1 n−1∑
k=0
(n− 1)!
(k + 1)!(n− (k + 1))!(m+ 1− α)
kα(n−1)−k
=
1
(m+ 1− α)n
(
1
m+ 1
)n−1 n−1∑
k=0
n!
(k + 1)!(n− (k + 1))!(m+ 1− α)
k+1α(n−1)−k
=
1
(m+ 1− α)n
(
1
m+ 1
)n−1 n−1∑
k=0
(
n
k + 1
)
(m+ 1− α)k+1α(n−1)−k
=
1
(m+ 1− α)n
(
1
m+ 1
)n−1 n∑
l=1
(
n
l
)
(m+ 1− α)lαn−l
=
1
(m+ 1− α)n
(
1
m+ 1
)n−1 [ n∑
l=0
(
n
l
)
(m+ 1− α)lαn−l − αn
]
=
1
(m+ 1− α)n
(
1
m+ 1
)n−1
[(m+ 1)n − αn]
=
m+ 1
(m+ 1− α)n
[
1−
(
α
m+ 1
)n]
.
26This takes into account the possibility that player i can be one of them.
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